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Abstract
Political Uncertainty and Crime in Transition Economies
Two stylized facts are often used to characterize the economies in transition: an
increase in the crime level and frequent government changes, where the party in
power is replaced by another party with a diﬀerent, and often opposite, ideological
orientation. We investigate the impact on agents’ honesty when agents perceive the
future form of government as uncertain, and also know that their own collective
decisions will eﬀect the government’s choice of type. Furthermore, we assume that
the form that the government will take depends, in part, on the collective behavior
of the agents. By endogenizing the joint decisions made by the agents, as well as
the government, we derive the social consequences of these choices, the induced level
of crime. Using the level of crime permits us to investigate comparative statics for
possible policy implications. We show that the complex interactions between the
government and the agents leads to some non-intuitive results.
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1. Introduction
In the almost two decades since the fall of communism, governments in the economies
in transition have changed frequently, becoming more or less democratic and more
or less authoritarian.1 These changes in government were influenced, in part, by
the reactions of agents within the society to government policies, as well as by the
actions taken by the participants in the government itself. Agents were forced to
make decision whose outcomes depended on the ensuing, but not completely known,
form of government, whereas the ensuing form of government was influenced by the
decisions of the agents. In this paper we investigate the impact on agents’ honesty
when agents perceive the future form of government as uncertain. Specifically, we
study the impact of this uncertainty, which we call political uncertainty, on the social
fabric of society as measured by its crime level.
Besides undergoing frequent changes in governments, often associated with re-
versals in ideological orientations, economies in transition are also characterized as
having experienced increases in crime. The issue of crime in transition economies
is widely discussed and well documented.2 Most models investigating the decisions
of agents in transition economies to steal start with a benchmark case in which the
agents face a known type of government. The agent optimizes given the existing
government, and then the problem is re-solved under the assumption of a diﬀerent
form of government. The agents’ decisions in the two situations are then compared.
Although agents make decisions in two diﬀerent contexts, there is no self-awareness
on the part of the agent that the government might be of diﬀerent types. Examples
of such studies include Polishchuk and Savvateev (2004), Sonin (2003), and Katz
1See Kornai (2006) for a listing of the changes in governments in various economies in transition.
Reversals of ideological orientation characterize these changes.
2See, for example, Lotspeich (1995) which notes empirical evidence relating to the increase in
crime rates across transition economies, and considers various explanations for the phenomenon.
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and Owen (2005). A particular type of government, known to the agents, is also
assumed in Grossman (1995) and Alexeev, Janeba and Osborne (2004), which focus
on "mafias" competing with the state for entrepreneurial rents. Dixit (2004), which
suggests a principal-agent model to capture the intent of a government to induce
eﬃciency in society, also assumes a given governmental form, known to the agents.
Hoﬀ and Stiglitz (2004) take a diﬀerent tack by assuming agents face uncertainty
regarding the form of government that will arise. They endogenize the probability of
occurrence of these governments using a consistency requirement among the agents,
and find that the uncertainty of governmental form leads to multiple solutions for
the crime level. Katz and Owen (2006) also consider a model with two governments.
They endogenize the probability of occurrence based on the implied revenues each
government might acquire and find a unique crime level. Neither Hoﬀ and Stiglitz
nor Katz and Owen allow the government to be an active participant in the choice of
its form.
We contribute to the literature on the rule of law in transition by allowing both
agents and the government to be active participants in the formation of the type of
government that evolves, and show some of the social consequences of such a joint
interaction. First, we permit the agents to make their decisions knowing not only that
the future form of government is uncertain, but also knowing that their own collective
decisions will eﬀect the government’s choice of type. Second, we assume that the
form that the government will take depends, in part, on the collective behavior of
the agents. By endogenizing the joint decisions made by the agents, as well as the
government, we derive the social consequences of these choices, the level of crime
induced. Using the level of crime permits us to investigate comparative statics for
possible policy implications. We show that the complex interactions between the
government and the agents leads to some non-intuitive results. We also contribute
to the literature on the role of institutions in transition (for example, Djankov and
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Murrell (2002), McMillan (2002) and Bevan and Estrin (2004)), and to that stressing,
more generally, that diﬀerent economic outcomes are to be expected from diﬀerent
institutional arrangements (for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2003)). We extend this literature by allowing
agents to be aware that they face diﬀerent institutional arrangements, and investigate
the implications of this knowledge.
2. Model
Tomodel the impact of changing governments on decisions made by agents, we assume
that at the moment the agents’ decisions are made, all agents believe that the present
government can evolve into one of two possible forms. At some point in the future,
the specific forms of government will be determined. The consequences of agents’
decisions depend on which form the government takes, and are thus influenced by the
uncertainty of this form, or what we call political uncertainty. On the other hand,
the ultimate choice of governmental form depends on the collective decisions of the
agents.
We designate the two possible forms of government as G1 and G2. G1 is a govern-
ment which is concerned with maximizing welfare and reducing crime in society, albeit
constrained by its tax revenues. G2 is a government which is interested in maximizing
tax revenue. The restriction of the model to two future forms of government is an
assumption of convenience. The two we have chosen have features that are meant to
represent a democratic government, G1, and a more self-serving government, G2.
There is a continuum of agents, each of whom owns one firm. Since operating a
firm honestly might turn out to be unrewarding if G2 were to come into existence, it
could be beneficial for the agent to divert to himself some of the firm’s funds to insure
against this possibility. To that end, we assume that the agent must decide whether
5
or not to steal assets from the firm, and if he chooses to steal, how much. Stealing,
of course, carries the risk of being caught and being punished, with the punishment
depending on the subsequent form of government.
We assume that at the outset, the value of each agent’s firm is normalized to 1.
Agent a must decide on the proportion τa, τa ∈ [0, 1], to steal from the firm. There is
a known probability λ, λ ∈ [0, 1], that an agent who steals τa will be caught, and this
probability is assumed common to both potential government types. We consider the
outcomes for the agent under G1 first. If the agents is caught, then under G1, the
agent must return the stolen funds to the government, plus pay an additional penalty.
The part of the firm not stolen, which we assume to have been run honestly, will be
taxed at the punitive rate t+ δ, t+ δ ≤ 1, where t, t ∈ [0, 1], is the normal tax rate,
and δ, δ ∈ [0, 1], is the addition to the normal tax rate as a consequence of the agent’s
having been caught stealing. Thus, agent a retains (1− t− δ)(1− τa)(1 + r) of the
firm at the end of the period, where r ∈ R represents the impact of economic growth
generated by G1. If agent a is not caught, then under G1 he keeps the stolen funds
and the honestly run part of the firm is worth (1− t)(1− τa)(1+ r). Turning to G2, if
agent a is caught stealing, then he is punished by having to pay the government the
proportion b, b ∈ [0, 1], of the entire firm. If agent a is not caught, under G2 he pockets
τa and the remainder of the firm is honestly run and worth (1 − t)(1 − τa) at the
end of the period. Notice that it is assumed that G2 does not create a climate which
allows the value of the firm to change. We assume that the level of law enforcement
is represented by λ, and that the agents understand that r will be chosen optimally
by G1, should it come into existence, and that b will be chosen optimally by G2,
should it come into existence. We further note that, since G1 is constrained by its
tax revenue, and since tax revenue is determined by the collective decisions of the
agents, it is possible that optimization by G1 might lead to a negative value for r.
The agents still must ascribe a probability to the coming into existence of G1 or
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G2. We let π, π ∈ [0, 1], represent this probability, and assume there is a linkage
between π and the level of honesty within a society. The collective decisions of all the
agents determine the proportion of these agents who steal more than some amount,
say γ, and we denote this proportion as K(γ). This proportion, in turn depends on
the agents’ knowing π and thus we can write K(γ) as K(π). We assume that π will
be determined in a way to satisfy π = 1−K(π).
We assume that each agent a incurs a cost (real or psychic) of stealing τa propor-
tion of the firm, and that this cost is of the form aτ 2a/2. Thus, we are assuming that
some agents find it easier to steal than others. Furthermore, we assume that the a
values which index the agents are distributed as H(a), a ∈ [0, 1], and that H(a) is
continuous.
The decision problem agent a faces is illustrated in the following diagram, where
O1 = 0+ (1− t− δ)(1− τa)(1+ r)− aτ 2a/2, O2 = τa+ (1− t)(1− τa)(1+ r)− aτ 2a/2,
O3 = (1− b)− aτ 2a/2, and O4 = τa + (1− t)(1− τa)− aτ 2a/2.
[Insert Figure 1]
Assuming that all the parameters are known to the agents, the expected value to
agent a of stealing τa is equal to
constant+ τa{(1− λ)t− π[(1− t− δλ)r + (1− t− δ)λ]}− aτ 2a/2 (1)
where the constant does not depend on τa. Diﬀerentiation of this expression yields
the optimum value of τa, denoted by τ ∗a, and which is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. τ ∗a =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 0 ≤ a ≤ V
V
a 0 < V < a
0 V ≤ 0
where V = (1− λ)t− π[(1− t− δλ)r + (1− t− δ)λ].
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We define the crime rate as the proportion of a values such that τ ∗a > γ.We denote
this crime rate as K(V | γ), and describe it in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. K(V | γ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 0 ≤ γ ≤ V
H[Vγ ] 0 < V < γ
0 V ≤ 0
.
Proof. See Appendix.
It was assumed that r and b would be determined by G1 or G2, should they
come into existence. We now address the evaluation of these variables. Assume the
government does not know the individual choices of agents, but rather does know the
decision of the representative (average) agent as well as a feature of the collective
decisions of the agents, namely the crime level. In what follows, we denote by τ ∗a the
percentage of the firm stolen by the representative agent.
We begin with G1’s problem. We assume that G1 chooses r to maximize its
benefits function B1(r), subject to a fiscal constraint. B1(r) has three components:
agent a’s increased wealth, tax revenue and the level of honesty in society. Thus, we
assume that B1(r) = [increased wealth] + [tax revenue] + [level of honesty] subject to
[tax revenue] ≥ [cost of government activities]. In particular, we let
B1(r) = [(1− λ)]τ ∗a + (1− t)(1− τ ∗a)(1 + r)− λδ(1− τ ∗a)(1 + r)
−aτ ∗2a /2] + [λτ ∗a + t(1− τ ∗a) + λδ(1− τ ∗a)](1 + r) (2)
+k[1−K[V | γ]] subject to [λτ ∗a + t(1− τ ∗a) + λδ(1− τ ∗a)](1 + r) ≥ c(r)
where k is the monetized marginal benefit the government gets from the level of
honesty in society, and c(r) is G1’s cost of implementing policies that bring about a
growth rate of 1 + r. The range of r values over which G1 optimizes B1(r) is from
the r value that yields a totally crime-ridden society to the value that yields a totally
law-abiding society. Specifically, let rl be the largest r value satisfying K(V | γ) = 1
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and ru be the smallest r value satisfying K(V | γ) = 0. Thus, the problem facing G1
is to choose r∗ to satisfy
r∗ = arg max
rl≤r≤ru
B1(r) such that (λ− t− λδ)τ ∗a + t+ λδ ≥ c(r)/(1 + r). (3)
Should G2 come into existence, since it is only concerned with maximizing its tax
revenue, it determines b∗ to satisfy
b∗ = arg max
0≤b≤1
B2(b) where B2(b) = λb+ (1− λ)(1− τ ∗a)()1− t). (4)
Before we can solve the either G1 or G2’s problem, we need to establish the level
of crime induced by these policies. Thus, we begin with the agents’ problems. For the
remainder of the paper we assume that the distribution of agents, H(a), is uniform.
That is, we assume H(a) = a for a ∈ [0, 1], H(a) = 0 for a < 0 and H(a) = 1 for
a > 1. Furthermore, we define L = (1− λ)t and M = (1− t− δλ)r+ (1− t− δ)λ. In
the next proposition we determine π∗.
Proposition 3. a. If M > 0 and if 0 < γ ≤ L−M , then π∗ = 0.
b. If 0 < M < L < γ, then π∗ = (γ − L)/(γ −M).
Proof. See Appendix.
We have excluded from consideration the case V < 0, which would have led to
π∗ = 1, implying certainty about the future form of government. We excluded this
case because we are interested in the implications of political uncertainty, specifically,
the uncertainty about the future form of government. For the remainder of the paper,
we will exclude the case π∗ = 0, for the same reason.
Since the government uses the typical agent a to formulate its policy, we next
establish how much the typical agent will steal from his firm.
Proposition 4. If 0 < M < L < γ < a, then τ ∗a = γa
L−M
γ−M .
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Proof. See Appendix.
We now return to the government’s problem. Recall that a is the value of a
attributed to the representative agent by the government in its calculations.
Earlier (Eq. 2), we established the problem that the government faced in deter-
mining the optimum value of r, r∗, if its form were G1. The next proposition provides
the solution to this problem.
Proposition 5. a. Under the condition of P4, G1 chooses r∗ as the largest value of
r ∈ [rl, ru] such that (λ− t− λδ)τ ∗a + t+ λδ ≥ c(r)/(1 + r).
b. Let λ > t+λδ. If c(rl)/(1+rl) < λ and c(ru)/(1+ru) ≥ t+λδ, then r∗ ∈ (rl, ru).
c. Let λ < t+λδ. If c(rl)/(1+rl) > λ and c(ru)/(1+ru) ≤ t+λδ, then r∗ ∈ (rl, ru).
Proof. See Appendix.
P5 establishes that the optimal value r∗ is determined solely by the boundary
(fiscal) constraint. Parts b and c provide conditions on the parameters that lead to
an internal solution, i.e., a result in which neither everyone in society is honest nor
everyone is dishonest. The conditions in parts b and c that lead to a non-extreme
crime level can be interpreted as describing a tension between the probability of being
caught and the tax plus penalty. For example, in part b, λ is assumed to be large
(relative to c(rl)/(1 + rl)). A larger probability of being caught should induce an
agent not to steal. But at the same time, the tax plus penalty is assumed to be small
(relative to c(ru)/(1 + ru)). A small penalty is an inducement to take a chance on
being caught stealing. Part c has a similar interpretation. The two remaining cases,
λ large and tax plus penalty large and λ small and tax plus penalty small, are not
treated here since they lead to the extreme description of society as being composed
of either all thieves or no thieves.
We also established in Eq. 4 the problem that the government faced in determining
the optimal value of b, b∗, if the government’s form were G2. The next proposition
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provides the solution to this problem.
Proposition 6. G2 chooses b∗ = 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Having determined r∗ and b∗, we can evaluate the agents’ decisions and determine
the level of crime induced by the agents’ uncertainty over which form of government
will come into being. In particular, we can evaluate V and π at these optimal values,
and when we do, we denote V as V ∗ and π as π∗. We next examine the impact on
K(V ∗ | γ) of changes in the parameter values.
We focus our investigation of the comparative statics of our model on the condi-
tions of parts b and c of P5. In so doing, we exclude the less interesting cases when
the result of the choices made lead to a society in which either everyone steals or
no one steals. The fact that r∗ > rl implies that V ∗ > 0, i.e., there will be some
resulting crime. Furthermore, P5 parts b and c imply that, at optimality, the revenue
constraint will be binding on G1, that is, τ ∗a = [
c(r∗)
1+r∗ − t − λδ]/(λ − t − λδ). By the
assumption of parts b and c, the right-hand-side of this equation is a positive fraction
so τ ∗a = Va < 1. Finally, since a > γ, it follows from P2 that K(V ∗ | γ) = H(V
∗
γ ).
Since H(V ∗γ ) is a monotonically increasing in V ∗, directional changes in K(V ∗ | γ) are
the same as those for V ∗. Let the right-hand-side of this revenue equation be denoted
by R(θ, r∗), i.e., R(θ, r∗) = [ c(r
∗)
1+r∗ − t−λδ]/(λ− t−λδ), where θ represents one of the
parameters λ, t, or δ. Note further that r∗ is also a function of θ. In what follows, the
partial derivatives are denoted by the appropriate subscript.
Proposition 7. Under the conditions of P5 parts b and c
a. π∗θ = 1γ−M [−Lθ +Mθπ∗].
b. τ ∗aθ =
γ
a [
1
γ−M ][Lθ −Mθπ∗].
c. r∗θ =
Lθ−Mθπ∗− aγ (γ−M)Rθ
Mr∗π∗+ aγ (γ−M)Rr∗
.
d. V ∗θ = a[Rθ +Rr∗r∗θ ].
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Proof. See Appendix.
We note that if c(r
∗)
(1+r) is constant, then Rr∗ = 0 and consequently V ∗θ = aRθr. Thus
the sign V ∗θ = signRθ. We use this fact to illustrate the comparative statics in the
example below.
Proposition 8. a. Under the conditions of P5 part b, V ∗λ < 0, V ∗t < 0, and V ∗δ < 0.
b. Under the conditions of P5 part c, V ∗λ > 0, V ∗t > 0, and V ∗δ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The main conclusion drawn from P8 is that predicting the direction of crime levels
based on marginal policy changes is inappropriate. Predictions of crime levels must
take into account the various values of all of the parameters in the system. To show
that there exist parameter values that satisfy our propositions, we finish with an
example.
3. Example
This example is meant to capture a situation in which law enforcement is mediocre
and the cost of structural improvement is high. Let t = .4, λ = .5, a = .5, γ = .25,
δ = .35, c(r) = c1(1 + r) and c1 = .556. It follows that L = .2 and M = .125 + .425r.
Thus for r < .176, the conditions for P3 hold, i.e., 0 < M < L < γ < a. From
P4, we have τ ∗a = 12
.075−.425r
.125−.425r and from P5 we have
1
2
.075−.425r
.125−.425r = .25 so r∗ = .059.
Substituting, we have π∗ = .5, τ ∗a = .25, V ∗ = .125 and H(V ∗/γ) = .5. Thus, the
government described by our example would produce a population in which one-half
of the agents would choose to steal more than one-quarter of their firm. Furthermore,
because c(r∗)/(1 + r∗) = .556, it exceeds λ and is less than t+ λδ = .575. Thus, the
conditions of part c of P5 are met. It follows from this that an incremental increase
in the probability λ of apprehending a thief would result in the undesired outcome of
increasing the crime level.
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4. Appendix
Proof of P2. If V ≤ 0, τ ∗a = 0 for all a values and therefore K(V | γ) = 0. If
a > V > 0, then τ ∗a = V/a and the a values satisfying τ ∗a > γ are those satisfying
a < V/γ. The proportion satisfying this inequality, K(V | γ) will thus equal H(V/γ)
if 0 < V/γ < 1 and 1 if V/γ > 1.¥
Proof of P3. Part a. Since V = L − πM, it follows that V ≥ L −M. Thus,
by assumption, V ≥ γ > 0 and from P2 K(V | γ) = 1. Thus, π∗, the probability
that G1 will come into existence, must satisfy π = 1 − K(V | γ), which becomes
π∗ = 1− 1 = 0.
Part b. Since 0 < M < L < γ, then again V > 0. Also, V = L − πM < L,
which by assumption is less than γ. Thus, 0 < V < γ, and from P2, π∗ must satisfy
π = 1− V/γ = 1− (L− πM)/γ. Solving for π yields part b.¥
Proof of P4. From the proof of P3 part b, we know that 0 < V < γ and
since γ < a, we have 0 < V < a. Thus, from P1, τ ∗a = V/a = (L − π∗M)/a =
[L− ( γ−Lγ−M )M ]/a =
γ
a
L−M
γ−M .¥
Proof of P5. Part a. FromEq. 2, G1 chooses r∗ to satisfy r∗ = argmaxrl≤r≤ru B1(r)
such that (λ− t− λδ)τ ∗a + t+ λδ ≥ c(r)/(1 + r). By combining terms, B1(r) can be
written as B1(r) = τ ∗a(1 + λr)] + (1 − τ ∗a)(1 + r) − aτ ∗
2
a /2] + k[1 − K(V | γ)] =
(1 + r)− τ ∗a(1− λ)r− aτ ∗
2
a /2 + k[1−K(V | γ)]. Since t+ δ ≤ 1 (tax cannot be more
than the value of the firm), M is an increasing function of r. From P4, it now follows
that τ ∗a is a decreasing function of r. Since τ ∗a is proportional to V, V is a decreasing
function of r. Therefore, B1(r) is an increasing function of r and it is maximized by
the largest value of r ∈ [rl, ru] that does not violate the constraint.
Part b. Since λ > t+λδ, the left-hand-side of the inequality (λ− t−λδ)τ ∗a+t+λδ
is a decreasing function of r with value λ when r = rl and value t+ λδ when r = ru.
The right-hand-side, c(r)/(1+ r), is non-decreasing and by assumption is less than λ
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when r = rl and greater than t+ λδ when r = ru. Therefore r∗ ∈ (rl, ru).¥
Part c. When λ < t + λδ, the left-hand-side of the inequality is an increasing
function of r, with values λ and t+ λδ at rl and ru respectively. the right-hand-side
is nondecreasing and is larger than λ at rl and small than t + λδ at ru. Thus, the
largest of the intersections of these curves r∗ ∈ (rl, ru).¥
Proof of P6. Since B2(b) = λb+ (1− λ)(1− τ ∗a)()1− t) and τ ∗a does not depend
on b, B2(b) is increasing in b and is bounded by 1.¥
Proof of P7. Part a. From P3, π∗θ =
−Lθ(γ−M)+Mθ(γ−L)
(γ−M)2 =
−Lθ
(γ−M) +
Mθ
(γ−M)
γ−L
(γ−M) =
1
(γ−M) [Lθ −Mθπ∗].
Part b. FromP4, τ ∗aθ =
γ
a [
(Lθ−Mθ)(γ−M)+Mθ(L−M)
(γ−M)2 ] =
γ
a [
Lθ
(γ−M)−
Mθ(γ−L)
(γ−M)2 =
γ
a(
1
(γ−M))[Lθ−
Mθπ∗].
Part c, Since τ ∗a−R(θ, r∗) = 0, , it follows that r∗θ = −
τ∗aθ−Rθ
τ∗ar−Rr∗
. Substituting, using
part b, and clearing fractions, yields part c.
Part d. Since τ ∗a = R(θ, r∗), it follows that τ ∗a = aR(θ, r∗) and the result follows.¥
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